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1. Introduction 
“I would not look to the US constitution, if I were drafting a constitution in the year 2012. I 
might look at the constitution of South Africa. . . . Much more recent than the US constitution 
– Canada has a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It dates from 1982.”1 Speaking on Egyptian 
TV in 2012, US Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made this statement recognizing 
the increasing influence of constitutional systems beyond the United States, including 
Canada’s. This remark attracted criticism at home, especially from conservative commentators 
who were quick to misinterpret it, but it was buttressed by academic scholarship and empirical 
findings. For example, a study published that same year lent support to the idea that Canada 
has been a “constitutional trendsetter among common law countries.”2 As the title of this 
review essay suggests, the interaction between Canada and other constitutional systems has 
been bidirectional. Indeed, if the Canadian constitutional paradigm has been influential around 
the world, this influence may also stem from comparative law being embedded into the 
country’s DNA.3 
                                                      
1 The Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project, ‘U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg to Egyptians: Look to the Constitutions of South Africa or Canada, Not to the U.S. Constitution, As a 
Model’ (February 7, 2012), https://www.memri.org/reports/us-supreme-court-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-
egyptians-look-constitutions-south-africa-or (last visited November 15, 2018). 
2 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
762, 809-23 (2012) (discussing whether Canada is a “constitutional superpower”). 
3 Anne-Marie Slaughter has made a similar point on the two-way direction of influence focusing specifically on 
constitutional courts, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 74 (2004) (noting that the 
“disproportionate influence” of courts such as the Canadian Supreme Court may result from their ability to 
“capture and crystallize the work of their fellow constitutional judges around the world”). 
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Therefore, the publication of two volumes on Canadian constitutional law, coinciding 
fittingly with the celebration of Canada’s sesquicentennial, is very timely. The Oxford 
Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford Handbook) and Canada in the World: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution (Canada in the World) provide 
excellent resources to consider the role of different legal traditions in the development of the 
Canadian constitutional system and, conversely, Canada’s increasing influence around the 
world. 
Running at 1,168 pages, the Oxford Handbook provides a comprehensive and 
authoritative account of key features of the Canadian constitution. Following the tradition of 
the Oxford Handbook series, leading authors have contributed concise chapters presenting the 
state of the field in their areas of expertise. These chapters are structured around six main 
themes: constitutional history; institutions and constitutional change; Indigenous Peoples and 
the Canadian constitution; federalism; rights and freedoms; and constitutional theory. This 
excellent volume will serve as a useful reference point for any scholar seeking a general albeit 
nuanced scholarly overview of the subject. The handbook strikes an effective balance between 
breadth (fifty chapters) and depth of analysis, which is supported by the successful thematic 
structure and the expertise of its contributors. There is a commendable emphasis on 
constitutional structure, with six chapters covering the three branches of government and 
eleven chapters addressing both general federalism theory and specific subject matters from a 
federalism perspective, ranging from health care to marriage, and from commercial law to 
environmental law and minority language rights. With respect to structural questions, some 
additional emphasis on administrative law in connection with the background constitutional 
structure would have been helpful in a volume of this scope and ambition, although Lorne 
Sossin’s contribution on “Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Constitution” (Oxford 
Handbook, Ch. 11) introduces this area very effectively and there are other chapters that touch 
on administrative law questions, e.g., Dwight Newman’s chapter on the section 35 duty to 
consult Indigenous Peoples (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 16).4  
Overall, consistent with the aims of this volume, the focus in the Oxford Handbook is 
on domestic constitutional law, with particular emphasis on three important themes: the 
formula for constitutional amendment in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982; the Charter of 
                                                      
4  Admittedly, there are other recent works that cover this area of public law; for instance, readers interested in 
this particular field can consult books such as ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CONTEXT (Colleen M. Flood & Lorne 
Sossin eds., 3rd ed. 2018). 
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Rights and Freedoms; and constitutional protections for Indigenous Peoples (Oxford 
Handbook, at 4). However, there are also references to foreign jurisdictions throughout several 
chapters and comparative engagement is the focal point of specific contributions. For instance, 
Mark Walters’s fascinating chapter explores the role of the British legal tradition in Canadian 
constitutional law, critiques A.V. Dicey’s view that the Canadian constitution was closer to the 
US rather than the UK constitution, and concludes that one of the distinctively Canadian 
contributions to constitutionalism is viewing “parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law as 
complementary not opposing ideals” (Oxford Handbook, at 122). This contribution is in 
interesting conversation with John Lovell’s chapter on parliamentary sovereignty (Oxford 
Handbook, Ch. 9) and Timothy Endicott’s and Peter Oliver’s chapter on the role of theory in 
Canadian constitutional law (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 44). Furthermore, the last chapter in the 
Oxford Handbook (Sujit Choudry’s “The Canadian constitution and the world”) explores the 
global influence of the Canadian constitutional model, with a particular emphasis on “dialogue 
theory” and the constitutional accommodation of minority nationalism. 
This concluding chapter is a good segue to the second book, Canada in the World, in 
which a comparative focus is more salient. The scope of coverage in this book is less extensive, 
which is understandable in a volume half the length of the Oxford Handbook (482 pages). 
Instead, the emphasis is on three main areas: the accommodation of diversity through the lens 
of federalism and constitutional pluralism (Part I); the role of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Part II); and the growing global influence of Canadian constitutionalism (Part III). Leading 
comparative public law scholars have contributed chapters, including on freedom of expression 
(Adrienne Stone), equality (Catharine MacKinnon), dialogue theory (Alison Young), and 
proportionality and “rights inflation” (Mark Tushnet). There is a heavier emphasis on rights 
rather than structural features of the Canadian constitution. This focus is, as Ran Hirschl notes 
in this very volume, reflective of the less extensive Canadian engagement with foreign 
constitutional experience regarding structural questions (Canada in the World, at 320-21). 
However, certain structural questions are addressed in the volume, for example, in Stephen 
Tierney’s chapter on federalism and Jamie Cameron’s chapter on constitutional amendment 
procedures (Canada in the World, Chs. 2 and 5).  
Therefore, the two books complement each other and, in tandem, provide a rich account 
both of external influences on the development of the Canadian constitutional model and the 
influence that this model has had overseas. A single review essay cannot do justice to the fifty 
chapters of the Oxford Handbook and the nineteen chapters of Canada in the World. Instead, 
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my aim is to identify certain key themes that emerge from the two books, which in turn 
highlight distinctive features of the Canadian system on which comparative scholars can draw. 
 
2. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a “national icon” 
It will probably come as little surprise that the exploration of key themes in the two books 
begins with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the national expression of Canada’s 
fundamental values (e.g., Oxford Handbook, at 621, 1017). Multiple contributions cover 
general issues about the Charter – e.g., Joanna Harrington’s chapter on interpreting the 
Charter, Carissima Mathen’s chapter on access to courts in constitutional cases, and Kent 
Roach’s chapter on Charter remedies (Oxford Handbook, Chs. 29, 30, 32) – while others cover 
specific rights. Interestingly, and appropriately, several authors situate the discussion of rights 
within a broader institutional framework. For instance, Yasmin Dawood demonstrates how the 
Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter as 
encompassing “a bundle of democratic rights, thus enabling it to regulate a wider array of 
democratic institutions and processes” (Oxford Handbook, at 717). Benjamin Berger analyzes 
freedom of religion within the broader context of the structure of Canadian constitutionalism, 
noting for example “the instability of the public/private divide as a means of analysing 
constitutional problems” (Oxford Handbook, at 758). In her chapter on equality and anti-
discrimination, Sonia Lawrence argues that the judiciary’s “preoccupation” with avoiding 
“institutional competence conflicts with legislatures” has resulted in the doctrinal choice to 
resolve many questions inside section 15 through a formalist and narrow conception of equality 
(Oxford Handbook, at 816). 
In celebrating the Charter, it is also important to keep in mind the limits in the scope 
of protection that the interpretation of the Charter has afforded. A series of contributions shed 
light on such limits. For example, Margot Young explains how liberal liberalism has curtailed 
the “transformative deployment” of the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person under 
section 7 of the Charter to advance social justice ambitions, e.g., by obligating the state to 
provide health care and adequate social assistance (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 37). Martha 
Jackman and Bruce Porter continue this important conversation by tracing two opposing 
paradigms of constitutional rights in socio-economic rights litigation: the first paradigm refuses 
to interpret the Charter as imposing positive obligations on governments while the second 
paradigm interprets broadly framed Charter provisions to “include, rather than exclude, human 
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rights violations experienced by disadvantaged individuals and groups” (Oxford Handbook, 
Ch. 40). In a similar vein, Catharine MacKinnon suggests that the judicial approach to section 
15 equality claims has sidelined “material hierarchy,” thus limiting the scope of the equality 
guarantee (Canada in the World, Ch. 10). Allan Hutchinson is particularly critical of this line 
of cases as reflecting a view “that individual entitlements are much more important than social 
responsibilities, that negative liberty is to be promoted at the expense of positive liberty” 
(Oxford Handbook, at 1001-02). 
 
3. The role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the context of institutional multiplicity 
Throughout the discussion of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada occupies a central 
place. Indeed, as already noted, one of the three main sections of Canada in the World is 
dedicated to this institution and the Oxford Handbook covers both the jurisprudence of the 
Court across a variety of areas as well as the constitutional status of the Court and judicial 
appointments (e.g., Adam Dodek’s and Rosemary Cairns Way’s contribution, Oxford 
Handbook, Ch. 10). Comparative public law scholars will be particularly interested in the 
Court’s progressive approach to interpreting the constitution, captured by the “living tree” 
metaphor. The metaphor originates in the famous Edwards case, in which the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, at the time the final court of appeal for Canada, described the 
constitution as a “living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”5 and 
was endorsed by the Supreme Court in post-Charter cases. It is also of interest that two 
contributions in the two volumes aim to demonstrate that the gap between the “living tree” 
approach and moderate versions of originalism is not significant.6 
Central as the position of the Supreme Court of Canada may be, it is also important to 
situate the Court within a broader framework of institutional multiplicity.7 Indeed, one of 
Canada’s distinctive, and well-known, contributions to constitutionalism and influential 
exports has been “dialogue theory.” This is the idea that the judiciary and the legislature are in 
                                                      
5 Edwards v Attorney General of Canada [1930] AC 124, 136. 
6 W.J. Waluchow’s refers to “constitutional construction” as a form of moderate originalism (Oxford Handbook, 
Ch. 42) and Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Hon. Grant Huscroft to “public meaning originalism” using case studies 
from Australia and Canada (Canada in the World, Ch. 8). 
7 For a more detailed discussion of the idea of “institutional multiplicity” in the context of constitutional 
interpretation and evolution, see Athanasios Psygkas, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Claims: Multiplicity of 




a dialogic relationship, whereby the judiciary may not have the final word and the legislature 
may respond to judicial decisions by amending its enactments (Peter Hogg and Ravi Amarnath, 
Oxford Handbook, at 1053-54). Peter Hogg and Ravi Amarnath describe the four features of 
the Charter that facilitate Charter dialogue. First, section 1 of the Charter, the “limitations 
clause,” invites this dialogue when courts, under the “minimal impairment” prong of the 
analysis, suggest less restrictive measures that the legislature can adopt.8 Second, qualified 
Charter rights facilitate dialogue under a similar mechanism to the general limitations clause. 
Third, the equality guarantee (section 15 of the Charter) can promote dialogue when a group 
is unconstitutionally excluded from a legislative scheme and the government responds to a 
judicial ruling by extending the scheme to groups that had been previously impermissibly 
excluded. Fourth, the notwithstanding clause (section 33 of the Charter) allows Parliament and 
provincial legislatures to re-enact a law on a temporary but renewable basis, notwithstanding 
that this law is found to be in violation of a right in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of the Charter. 
Both the political cost and the temporal limits of invoking section 33 point to the limitations of 
the notwithstanding clause. However, as Janet Hiebert (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 33) and Alison 
Young (Canada in the World, Ch. 14) explain, this clause has been influential in other systems 
such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, namely systems representing what 
Stephen Gardbaum has described as the “new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism.”9  
A detailed examination of the merits and demerits of this model is beyond the scope of 
this review. The main point to highlight here is that the emphasis on the Canadian Supreme 
Court should be combined with examining the broader institutional environment in which 
Canada’s top court operates and how it interacts with other institutions. Kent Roach’s 
contribution (Canada in the World, Ch. 12) helpfully turns the spotlight on such interactions 
by examining another “Canadian constitutional export” – the suspended declaration of 
invalidity, whereby the effect of a judicial ruling of unconstitutionality is suspended to give the 
legislature time to enact Charter-compliant legislation. Roach argues that this remedy 
contemplates “a partnership or dialogue between courts and legislatures” and provides space 
to the latter “to select among a variety of constitutional options and to devise complex and 
                                                      
8 Adrienne Stone also makes this point in the case of freedom of expression noting that “a constitutional order 
like Canada’s, committed to facilitating inter-institutional interaction, may well be more receptive than others to 
proportionality-based review . . . [W]here a law fails a proportionality test on the means-ends element of the 
proportionality analysis, it is open to the parliament to respond with a law that more effectively pursues its 
objective or does so in a manner more narrowly tailored towards that objective” (Canada in the World, at 258-
59). Charles-Maxime Panaccio’s contribution analyses section 1 of the Charter (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 31). 




multi-faceted remedies that the courts could not devise” (Canada in the World, at 290). He 
concludes that “we cannot simply rely on independent and even heroic judges to deliver 
effective remedies. Remedies are deeply dialogic in requiring good faith and prompt 
cooperation from the executive, the legislature and the larger society to be truly effective” 
(Canada in the World, at 291). 
Finally, to this multiplicity of actors outside the courts we should add administrative 
agencies (Oxford Handbook, at 238-41). In 1996, Canadian Supreme Court Justice Beverley 
McLachlin (as she then was) captured this eloquently in a dissenting judgment which has since 
been endorsed by the Court:  
The Charter is not some holy grail which only judicial initiates of the 
superior courts may touch. The Charter belongs to the people. All law and 
law-makers that touch the people must conform to it. Tribunals and 
commissions charged with deciding legal issues are no exception. Many 
more citizens have their rights determined by these tribunals than by the 
courts. If the Charter is to be meaningful to ordinary people, then it must 
find its expression in the decisions of these tribunals.10 
 
4. Constitutional pluralism 
The role of constitutional actors beyond the Supreme Court is only one manifestation of 
constitutional pluralism in Canada. Indeed, as Richard Albert notes perceptively in the 
introduction to Canada in the World, the need and will to accommodate diversity is rooted 
deeply in the history of the country (Canada in the World, at 8). He adds that Canada has been 
engaged in a long process of trying to reconcile “not only its external British and American 
influences but also a more complex interaction of internal forces that simultaneously pull and 
push Canada toward the particularistic political commitments of Confederation and the 
universalist aspirations of the Charter” (Canada in the World, at 3). In a similar vein, David 
Schneiderman’s chapter on constitutional culture demonstrates that, despite attempts at 
imposing a unitary vision, the Canadian constitutional project has been pluralistic (Oxford 
Handbook, at 914). Ayelet Shachar further directs our attention to the “globally unique” 
explicit commitment to the value of multiculturalism in the Charter (Canada in the World, at 
130). 
                                                      
10 Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, at [70]. The Supreme Court endorsed this 




Both volumes engage critically with Canada’s commitment to pluralism, primarily 
around two axes: federalism, and the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the 
Canadian state. Both volumes also acknowledge that Canadian government policy has not 
always aimed at accommodation but rather assimilation.11 When it comes to federalism, 
Stephen Tierney elucidates how Canada’s diversity, notably Quebec’s cultural and linguistic 
specificity, resulted in Canada assuming a more overtly plurinational political and 
constitutional character over time (Canada in the World, at 35). In this context, Tierney argues, 
“the consent that underpins the legitimacy of the federal polity is the consent of its constituent 
territories as well as that of the individual citizens of the state” (Canada in the World, at 47). 
He then concludes that the strong attachment to the principle of provincial equality takes 
seriously the issue of provincial recognition but may not take full account of Canada’s 
biculturalism (Canada in the World, at 48). 
Patrick Macklem moves the analysis from federalism to “a less familiar commitment 
to legal pluralism,” that is, the constitutional relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the 
Canadian state (Canada in the World, Ch. 4). He notes that “the ethos of constitutional 
pluralism immanent in early encounters between Indigenous and colonial peoples failed to take 
root.” Instead, a “monistic account” of the constitutional order prevailed and the Crown 
negotiated treaties with Indigenous Peoples “for reasons antithetical to pluralism’s promise” 
(Canada in the World, at 84, 86).  After section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which 
recognizes and affirms “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples,” 
treaty rights assumed a new constitutional status and “recover[ed] the promise of constitutional 
pluralism” (Canada in the World, at 90). Macklem refers to judicial decisions that 
“occasionally hint at an ethos of constitutional pluralism” when they refer to reconciling “pre-
existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty.”12 However, he continues, 
these statements do not render the relations between Indigenous Peoples and Canada 
constitutionally plural. For this to happen, Indigenous governments would need to be 
constitutionally recognized as “sovereign within their spheres of authority, capable of 
exercising exclusive and concurrent lawmaking powers formally equivalent to their federal and 
provincial counterparts” (Canada in the World, at 95-96).  
                                                      
11 See, e.g., Oxford Handbook, at 3 (“at certain points in Canadian history, governments were intent not on mutual 
accommodation but on assimilation”) and Canada in the World, at 24 (“despite the accolades Canada has earned 
abroad for the theory and doctrine of its constitutional law, the lived experience of many of the peoples of Canada 
remains one of misgiving, disenchantment and also of anger for a past that remains unreconciled with the 
present”). 
12 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, at [20]. 
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The meaning of sovereignty in this process of reconciliation is explored further in 
Jeremy Webber’s chapter on “contending sovereignties” (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 13). The 
focus of Indigenous arguments, Webber suggests, is on a meaning of sovereignty emphasizing 
the origin of political authority and the concept of self-government. A culturally diverse 
political community, such as Canada, must develop organizing principles to sustain this plural 
community. These principles, Webber concludes, “can be plural in their origins, drawing upon 
different traditions and speaking different normative languages” (Oxford Handbook, at 298). 
John Borrows’s rich account of varied examples of Indigenous constitutionalism sheds further 
light on this constitutional pluralism (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 2). This diverse constitutional 
experience makes Canada a distinctly interesting case. After all, as Borrows puts it, “Canada’s 
constitutional genealogy cannot be recounted without accounting for Indigenous 
constitutionalism across the land” (Oxford Handbook, at 38). 
The discussion of federalism and Indigenous constitutionalism reflects a broader 
question: whose voices are heard in Canada’s ongoing constitutional project and how can this 
process bring in the experience of historically underrepresented groups? The contributions in 
Part III of the Oxford Handbook could be read to respond to this question with respect to 
Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin address the role of 
women in the project of constitutional authorship in their chapter on feminist constitutionalism 
in Canada (Oxford Handbook, Ch. 45). 
 
5. Conclusion: Comparative law 
This review essay identified key themes that reflect the identity of Canada’s constitutional 
order and represent fruitful areas for comparative engagement. The last area of comparative 
interest is the role of comparative engagement itself in Canadian constitutional law. 
Former Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin provides an apt summary: “Canadian 
lawyers are comparative lawyers; Canadian judges are comparative judges. It’s not a matter of 
debate; it’s simply the way we are, the way our history has made us” (Canada in the World, at 
30). As was noted earlier, the influence between the Canadian and foreign legal systems is a 
two-way street or, to use Ran Hirschl’s description, Canada is both “importer and exporter of 
constitutional thought” (Canada in the World, Ch. 13). The influence of different legal 
traditions was embedded in the Canadian system from its beginnings and has remained 
important until today. As Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem, and Nathalie Des Rosiers outline in 
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their introduction to the Oxford Handbook, the Canadian legal system brought together two 
cultures: one predominantly French-speaking and governed by civil law; the other 
predominantly English-speaking and governed by common law (Oxford Handbook, at 3). The 
preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 refers to “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of 
the United Kingdom.” At the same time, the adoption of a federal constitutional architecture, 
the shared common law tradition, more recently the adoption of a bill of rights in the form of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and geographic proximity, among other factors, 
also made Canada’s neighbor to the south an obvious comparator. Indeed, an empirical study 
found that the Canadian Supreme Court cited 1,944 foreign precedents in its 1,004 
constitutional cases during the first 32 years of the Charter (1982-2013) – 1,183 of these 
citations were to US judgments (61%) and 516 to UK judgments (27%).13 Furthermore, the 
richness of Canada’s normative pluralism is further enhanced by the diversity of its Indigenous 
legal systems, even though, as discussed earlier, the “ethos of constitutional pluralism” has not 
(yet) taken root with respect to Indigenous law. 
Conversely, as Ran Hirschl demonstrates, constitutional innovation has been one of 
Canada’s main intellectual exports (Canada in the World, at 305). Richard Albert highlights 
similarly that the Canadian constitution has influenced the design of the South African Bill of 
Rights, the Israeli Basic Laws, the New Zealand Bill of Rights, and the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights (Canada in the World, at 2). Different chapters in the volume trace this path of influence. 
For instance, Heinz Klug uses the example of the limitations clause (section 1 of the Charter) 
to document how Canadian constitutional experience was drawn upon in the process of drafting 
and interpreting the South African constitution (Canada in the World, Ch. 17). Klug adds that 
Canada’s contribution is most clearly observed in the jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court. His analysis shows that Canadian law has been “the most cited source of 
foreign law in the Constitutional Court between 1995 and 2015, if even only slightly ahead of 
the United States” (Canada in the World, at 406-10). Moving to an example of an international 
court, Lech Garlicki notes that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cites the 
Supreme Court of Canada more regularly than any other foreign court, including the US 
Supreme Court and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. He explains that ECtHR 
references to Canadian precedents are mostly focused on cases involving the UK because UK 
courts have cited Canadian cases at the earlier stage of domestic proceedings. Garlicki 
                                                      
13 Gianluca Gentili, Enhancing Constitutional Self-Understanding through Comparative Law: An Empirical Study 
of the Use of Foreign Case Law by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982–2013), in COURTS AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW 378, 395 (Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve, eds., 2015). 
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discusses two examples in which the ECtHR engaged with the reasoning of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in cases involving assisted suicide and prisoners’ voting rights (Canada in the 
World, Ch. 15). Finally, it should be noted that, while most chapters illustrate the influence of 
Canadian constitutional law in other jurisdictions, Wen-Chen Chang offers a cautionary note. 
Chang points to the limits of the Canadian Supreme Court’s influence in East Asia, drawing 
on the examples of a common law court, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, and a civil law 
court, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court (Canada in the World, Ch. 16). 
As the two volumes reviewed here mark the celebration of Canada’s sesquicentennial, 
it is probably fitting to conclude with a note on Canada’s ongoing constitutional project. In this 
regard, Richard Albert stresses the endurance and legitimacy of the Canadian constitution, 
which he attributes to the constitution’s “continued contestability” rather than a single founding 
moment. He adds that “the Canadian commitment to the living constitution entails the political 
reality that the Constitution is both an unfinished and an unfinishable project of self-
government. . . . This unsteady state invites both challenges and opportunities” (Canada in the 
World, at 8). Other contributions echo the related idea of “agonistic constitutionalism” (Oxford 
Handbook, at 290-91 and 1024-25), namely, a version of constitutionalism that recognizes the 
existence of fundamental political disagreement and diversity and views constitutional 
development “as something that must proceed day by day, not through the fiat of a closed set 
of founding fathers or their privileged successors.”14 
Comparative public law scholars can contribute insights to these contested domestic 
debates building on a long tradition of comparative engagement within Canada. Conversely, 
Canada has and will continue to serve as a source of constitutional inspiration for comparative 
public lawyers, especially, though not exclusively, in common law systems. For both of these 
comparative enterprises and for scholars both inside and outside Canada, the Oxford Handbook 
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14 JEREMY WEBBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 8 (2015). 
